We generally describe metadata as information about an electronic or digital document, but the notion of metadata is undeniably broad. Given that the recent debate on the nature and value of metadata is due to the interception of communications-related metadata, this paper focuses on metadata created via the Internet, wirelessly or cable. In two previous articles — Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance and Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association`s Specificity Requirement — Katherine Strandburg argued that metadata surveillance programs are subject to First Amendment restrictions and that the massive and indiscriminate collection and use of communication metadata violates First Amendment requirements. also under existing jurisprudence on “freedom of association”. However, much more needs to be done to determine exactly when a metadata monitoring program should be considered a violation of the First Amendment and how those programs should be adapted to meet First Amendment requirements. For example, should a surveillance program be constitutionally suspect simply because it allows the government to draw (too much) sensitive conclusions about private associations? Or would applicants have to prove that such conclusions were drawn? While the latter approach is attractive in principle, it may be difficult to define and implement an effective “association-sensitive use restriction” in practice. For example, what level of suspicion should be required to justify the collection and use of metadata by the government to investigate associations between individuals or within groups? These are some of the questions we continue to explore as part of the ongoing work on this project. Published by Privacy International, this video provides an introduction to metadata, focusing on what metadata is, why it matters, and what metadata reveals. The second challenge is to understand and delineate how the distinction between data and metadata interacts with the distinction between mass surveillance and targeted surveillance. The size, shape or color of an envelope can sometimes be very indicative of the message it contains. For example, the color and style of the envelope can indicate whether the content is professional or personal in nature.
the return address or logo on the envelope may indicate from whom it originated; the postmark may reveal the date of dispatch and where; Handwriting that differs from computer-generated addresses may indicate that the correspondence is from an individual rather than a sophisticated company. The Spencer decision is a logical extension of previous Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on privacy, computers and computer-generated information. In R. v. Morelli, a majority of the Supreme Court, noted that computers used for personal purposes, no matter where they are or who owns them, “often contain our most intimate correspondence. They contain details of our financial, medical and personal situation. They even reveal our specific interests, preferences, and inclinations by recording in browsing history and cache files the information we seek and read, view, or hear on the Internet. In R. v. Cole, he added: “This is particularly the case when, as in this case, the computer is used to surf the Internet. Internet-connected devices “reveal our specific interests, preferences, and inclinations by recording in browser history and cache files the information we seek and read, view, or hear on the Internet.” This type of private information is at the heart of the “biographical core” protected by Article 8 of the Charter.
While enough metadata can provide a lot of valuable information associated with the same person, collecting metadata in certain contexts can sometimes also identify the specific person associated with that data. For example, in a process known as “social network analysis” or “contact chaining” — in which a diagram of the human network is created around a particular individual — analysts can identify anyone who has one or two degrees of separation from the individual of interest. A contact chaining card can show how everyone in the network environment is connected. Even separating one or two “jumps” from an identified suspect can lead to a rapidly growing network of contacts, some of whom may be unaware of the suspects. One such example is found in footnote 19, “Connecting the Dots: Tracking Two Terrorism Suspects,” where monitoring the activities of two suspects, including information about phone calls made, emails sent and meetings held, creates a picture of their personal network. With enough information, the target could be identified, in addition to other people in the target`s network. In order for cataloguers and rights metadata analysts to complete the recommended metadata elements, the institution needs ground rules or assumptions to apply when the status of copyright and publication is unclear, as well as some suggested resources to find the information they are looking for. There are many recommendations where to look for the requested information. Currently, there are no resources that describe generally accepted practices on what is legally reasonable to assume about copyright or publication when available information is limited, requiring institutions to develop their own policies.15 Of course, local policies regarding the use of material considered copyrighted and the institution`s tolerance of copyright claims counterfeits that occur when the assumption is incorrect and that determine usage decisions.16 With a little background information needed to make informed decisions about the rights of many works in an institution`s collections, it could be easily accessible if the proposed rights information is captured. The impact of data and metadata separation on the Fourth Amendment was one of the main objectives of our study. During the 2015-2016 academic year, we produced two articles on this topic. The first concerns metadata in context, referenced above.
In this article, Paula Kift and Helen Nissenbaum argue that calls for “metadata” are often intended to divert attention from normative issues that are central to the Fourth Amendment, including, but not limited to, an assessment of the social contexts in which information sharing and surveillance take place. The paper`s findings were presented both at the Amsterdam Privacy Conference in the fall of 2015 and at a workshop at the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) in spring 2016. The second paper, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, explores similar issues. Kiel Brennan-Marquez argues that the protection of information shared by the Fourth Amendment should depend on the relationship between the sharing party and the receiving party (and has implicitly depended on that in previous jurisprudence). Although, in some contexts, it is logical to argue that if A shares information with B, A loses his expectation of privacy in the information, the argument ceases to make sense if the nature of the relationship between A and B is such that B holds A`s information “in trust.” Metadata In Context and Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries draw on Katherine Strandburg`s earlier work on the impact of technological change on Fourth Amendment doctrine, particularly Home, Home on the Web and other implications of technosocial change on the Fourth Amendment.
